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Abstract: Compensation for future loss due to wrongful injury in Ireland is currently determined at 
discount rates that do not take account of current market conditions and on a historic mortality basis. 
We quantify the impact of assessing damages using a more appropriate discount rate, mortality basis, 
and method of capitalising the loss. This results in the quantum of damages increasing significantly, and 
figures are given quantifying the increase by the term of the loss. Total outstanding liabilities of the 
State Claims Agency now exceed €3 billion, about half of which is in respect of catastrophic birth 
injuries caused by negligence in the delivery of maternity services. The change in the basis by which 
compensation is calculated outlined in this paper would increase the estimate of outstanding liabilities 
by over €1 billion and perhaps closer to €2 billion. We argue the current under-compensation of 
plaintiffs incentivises the State to settle by way of lump sum and is therefore an obstacle to the required 






This paper reviews the legal principles to determine compensation for future loss in wrongful injury cases in Ireland. The judgement in the landmark case, Gill 
Russell v Health Service Executive case, is analysed and applied to current 
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circumstances. We show that awards made by Irish courts should be materially 
higher than at present when this precedent is properly reflected in the determination 
of lump sum compensation.  
The principles of risk minimisation set by the precedent to investment risk can 
equally be applied to the longevity risk currently borne by the plaintiff (that is the 
risk the plaintiff lives longer than expected in the lump sum calculation). We explore 
how this might be achieved now that the long-awaited legislation anticipated to 
transfer longevity risk to the State proved unsatisfactory. It is shown that reducing 
the longevity risk to the plaintiff further increases the quantum of damages.  
We outline the impact this judgement has on the discount rate, mortality basis, 
and approach to longevity risk. We estimate that the required change in basis by 
which compensation is calculated increases the outstanding liabilities of the State 
by more than €1 billion, and perhaps closer to €2 billion. 
The paper is divided into eight sections. First, we outline the rise in claims 
against the State over the last decade. It is shown that the growth of both claim 
settlements and the rise in outstanding liabilities has averaged more than 15 per 
cent per annum since 2010. Second, we overview the principles of how 
compensation for future loss should be estimated under Irish law. We apply the 
principles to current market conditions in the subsequent two sections and quantify 
the extent to which lump sum compensation is currently undercompensating the 
plaintiff due to outdated investments assumptions. Consistent with legal principles 
and precedent, this paper shows that the real discount rate for wage-related loss 
should be –2.5 per cent, as opposed to the +1 per cent discount rate currently used.  
Third, we analyse the longevity risk imposed on the plaintiff by the current 
lump sum form of compensation. The life table, which determines the probability 
of survival and therefore the likelihood of each future loss being incurred, should, 
we show, be based on cohort mortality rates and not the period mortality rates 
generally employed. Also, the method of capitalising the future loss into a lump 
sum award should make explicit the longevity risk borne by the plaintiff. We show 
that the current method of allowing for this risk gives a probability of greater than 
50 per cent that the lump sum form of compensation will be exhausted before the 
death of the plaintiff and therefore undercompensates the plaintiff. We quantify the 
increase in compensation necessary to ensure, at probability of 50 per cent or higher, 
that the lump sum will not be exhausted.  
The paper then considers why the long-awaited legal reform to allow periodic 
payments for the remainder of the plaintiff’s lifetime proved inadequate, 
highlighting how the current practice in capitalising future loss is an obstacle that 
should first be removed. We quantify the increase in outstanding liabilities to the 
State when compensation is calculated at current market conditions consistent with 
legal principles and show the increase in the current outstanding liability exceeds 
€1 billion and perhaps is closer to €2 billion.  
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We conclude by reiterating the need for appropriate legislation to effect periodic 
payment orders to replace lump sum compensation. We also suggest that it might 
be more cost-effective for the State to invest more in the delivery of sound maternity 





The State Claims Agency (SCA) operates two insurance schemes, the Clinical 
Indemnity Scheme (CIS) and the General Indemnity Scheme (GIS). The CIS covers 
all clinical claims against the Health Service Executive, and some other parties. 
The GIS covers all non-clinical claims against the State, State authorities, and 
various other bodies such as community and comprehensive schools, the Garda 
Síochána, and the prison service. Since the start of 2010, total claims settled by the 
State Claims Agency exceeded €1.9 billion. A total of €1.69 billion was paid out 
in respect of the Clinical Indemnity Scheme (CIS), which represented 89 per cent 
of total payments since 2010. Figure 1 illustrates the rising costs of claim 
settlements each year since 2010. 
 
 
Figure 1: Total Claims Amounts Paid under the Clinical and General 
Schemes in € million, 2010 to November 2019 (includes Damages, Legal 

















Source: Data from Memo prepared by the SCA in answer to Dáil Question on 5 December 
2019 by Deputy Michael McGrath, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-12-
05/57.  
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The number of new claims in recent years has been increasing at a faster rate 
than the number being resolved, so the number of outstanding claims continues to 
rise. Figures from the Annual Reports and Accounts of the National Treasury 
Management Agency of which the SCA is a division, show that the estimated total 
liabilities to outstanding claims under both schemes amounted to €3.15 billion  
at the end of 2018, up from €783 million in June 2010. In 2011, the Director  
of the SCA estimated that cases of cerebral palsy at birth, although only 3 per cent 
of the claims by number, accounted for two-thirds of the CIS liability (Breen, 2011, 
pp. 37-38). The most recent breakdown of accounts is given in the Annual Report 
and Accounts for 2017, where some 53 per cent of the value of outstanding  
claims (of both CIS and GIS) were in respect of claims against maternity 
services (€1.4 billion compared to total estimated outstanding claims then of  
€2.66 billion). 
The rate of growth of claim settlements and the rise in outstanding liabilities 
has averaged more than 15 per cent per annum since 2010. The bigger part of this 
increase is due to the growth in the number of notified claims, especially claims 
against maternity units for catastrophic brain injuries at birth. However, another 
contributor to the growth in value is due to a change in how the judiciary determines 
the lump sum compensation for future pecuniary loss. Future wage or inflation-
linked losses were discounted at 3 per cent per annum at the start of the decade, 
following the ruling in Luke Boyne v Bus Átha Cliath and James McGrath [High 
Court Record No. 2000/12133P] (see Whelan, 2009). However, the discount rate 
was contested in 2014 in the case Gill Russell v Health Service Executive (High 
Court Record No. 2009 1918P), when it was reduced to 1 per cent per annum for 
wage-link loss and 1.5 per cent per annum for inflation-linked loss. These discount 
rates were later upheld by the Court of Appeal (Appeal No. 2015/49). This reduction 
in discount rate puts a higher value on the present value of future losses and 
therefore the lump sum compensation. This ruling by the courts caused the SCA to 
raise its estimate of outstanding liabilities by €300 million or about 17 per cent1 
and of course, raises the value of all new claims. 
The judgement in Gill Russell v Health Service Executive is generally 
summarised by the impact it has on the discount rate, as above. However, a more 
accurate summary is that the judiciary made explicit the principles by which 
discount rates are to be determined. In short the original High Court judgement, 
developed and clarified by the Court of Appeal, states that the discount rate  
for inflation-linked loss should be determined using the real yield on index- 
linked bonds and, for wage-linked loss, this real discount rate should be further 
reduced.  
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1 NTMA Annual Report and Accounts, 2015, p. 37.
III PRINCIPLES OF CAPITALISING DAMAGES FOR LUMP SUM 
COMPENSATION 
 
Compensation for personal injury in Ireland is based on the fundamental principle 
that as far as possible the wronged party should be restored to the position that he 
or she was in prior to the incident giving rise to the claim (restitutio in integrum). 
The same principle also applies in the UK, US, and many other jurisdictions 
(Thornton and Ward, 2009).  
Until October 2018, compensation in Ireland for any injury had to be paid by 
way of a single lump sum. From October 2018, claims for catastrophic injury could 
be settled by way of annual payments for the remainder of the plaintiff's lifetime. 
A total of six such periodic payment orders had been put in place before the High 
Court ruled in November 2019 that the legislation was a “dead letter” as “no judge 
charged with protecting plaintiffs’ best interests could recommend such a scheme” 
[Judgement in Jack Hegarty v Health Service Executive, High Court Record No 
2015/10520P]. Given that periodic payments orders are currently in abeyance, we 
shall first consider how precedent has determined lump sums are calculated. We 
shall reconsider in a later section what amendment to the legislation is required to 
achieve periodic payment orders that deliver fair compensation. 
Once the court determines from the evidence presented the amount, term and 
nature of the future loss, then it must calculate a present value of the future stream 
of losses to give a capitalised value. This capitalised value is then added to the 
amounts determined in respect of losses suffered to the time of trial (past losses) 
and non-pecuniary losses (e.g. compensation for pain and suffering, life expectancy 
curtailed, quality of life impaired) to give the overall lump sum compensation. The 
quantum in respect of future loss comprises most of the ultimate lump sum award 
for brain-damaged infants. 
There are two different approaches to estimating the real return on a lump sum 
award invested to meet future losses, generally referred to as the “fair value” 
approach and the “best estimate” approach. 
The fair value approach takes the view that if there exists a freely traded asset 
whose proceeds exactly reproduce the future pecuniary loss (i.e. a replicating asset), 
then the market price of the replicating asset gives the capitalised value. In the 
situation that there is no freely traded asset, then the fair value approach is to 
estimate the value of such a replicating asset if it was freely traded on the market. 
So, suppose that the plaintiff’s loss is a series of future payments that rise in line 
with general inflation for the remainder of their lifetime. If there exist index-linked 
gilts (ILGS), of very long maturities, issued by the State (or another organisation 
with a good credit rating), then a judiciously selected portfolio of such bonds can 
provide a future inflation-linked stream of payments that closely match the future 
loss. The fair value approach takes the market value of such a portfolio of index-
linked bonds to be the amount of the compensatory lump sum for future loss. This 
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solution not only derives a present value for the inflation-linked pecuniary loss but 
also gives a method to invest the lump sum to restore the plaintiff’s lost cash flows.  
Alternatively, the best estimate approach estimates the expected real return on 
an investment portfolio that is deemed appropriate to provide for the future loss 
given the risk appetite of the plaintiff.  
The key difference in the two approaches is how investment risk is treated. The 
fair value approach is based on minimising the investment risk to the plaintiff and 
gives the same answer as the best estimate approach when the plaintiff is assumed 
to be risk averse. The best estimate approach assumes that the plaintiff can tolerate 
some level of investment risk and constructs an investment strategy that maximises 
the expected return based on that assumed level of risk. Typically, the best estimate 
approach gives a higher expected return than the fair value approach and thus a 
lower level of damages, as future loss is discounted at this higher rate. In short, the 
best estimate approach assumes that the plaintiff can tolerate investment risk to 
some extent, and reduces the lump sum determined by the fair value approach by 
the extent of investment risk to be borne by the plaintiff.  
Before the hearing of Gill Russell v Health Service Executive in the High Court 
in 2014 (High Court Record No. 2009 1918P), the precedent on how discount rates 
were to be determined was set by Mr Justice Finnegan in 2002 in the case of Luke 
Boyne v Bus Átha Cliath and James McGrath [High Court Record No. 
2000/12133P]. Here it was established that a prudent investor would invest in a 
mixed portfolio of higher risk equities and lower risk gilts, the mix reflecting the 
circumstances of the plaintiff. He judged that a portfolio consisting of 70 per cent 
in equities and 30 per cent in gilts was prudent for the plaintiff Mr. Boyne and such 
a portfolio would reasonably mitigate the damages. On the basis of evidence 
presented, he assessed that the real rate of return on such a portfolio would be  
3 per cent, and therefore set 3 per cent as the discount for any loss rising with 
inflation. 
The two different approaches to estimating the real return on a lump sum award 
were reconsidered in 2014 in the case Gill Russell v Health Service Executive. This 
case determined that the fair value approach is preferable over the previous best 
estimate approach adopted. The judgement was contested but upheld by the Court 
of Appeal (Appeal No. 2015/49). The ruling is best summarised in some key quotes 
from the judgement in the High Court trial and the elaboration and clarifications 
given by the subsequent ruling in the Court of Appeal. 
 
Finding of Cross J. in High Court: 
•  “I favour the plaintiff’s experts’ conclusions not because I have any capacity 
to be an economic forecaster but rather because they have demonstrated that 
investment in ILGS [Index-linked Gilts] is more risk adverse than any mixed 
fund. You do not have to be in any sense an expert in economics to come to 
that conclusion.” (para 2.73). 
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• “…I consider that over Gill’s lifetime, the price of ILGS will as a matter of 
probability increase and accordingly, I hold that a figure of 1.5 per cent (i.e. 
0.5 per cent being the present price plus 1 per cent to represent the future) is a 
fair figure for a multiplier on the basis of investment in ILGS.” (para 2.65)  
 
Findings of Court of Appeal 
• “Quite correctly, in the view of this Court, Cross J. determined that the 
assessment of the real rate of return is to be made on the assumption that the 
plaintiff should be entitled to invest his award in as risk free an investment 
strategy as is available and which will likely meet his future care needs. In 
particular, we agree with his conclusion that the plaintiff is not to be treated as 
an ordinary prudent investor for the purposes of calculating the likely return 
on the investment of his lump sum. In adopting this approach, the High Court 
judge appropriately adopted the reasoning of the House of Lords in Wells.” 
(para 83) 
 
• “It follows that we are satisfied that his conclusion that the plaintiff’s lump sum 
should be calculated by reference to ILGS, was well founded on the evidence 
as was his conclusion that wage inflation in the health care sector is likely to 
outstrip general inflation in early course and is likely to continue in that vein 
over his lifetime.” (para 160). 
 
In 2017, the Supreme Court refused to allow the HSE leave to appeal against the 
Court of Appeal Judgment. 
So both Courts concluded that the fair value approach, which minimises the 
investment risk for the plaintiff, is the better of the two approaches to determine 
the real return on any lump sum award. Both Courts also agreed, based on the 
evidence presented, that the real rate of return should be estimated with reference 
to the real return on Index-Linked Gilts (ILGS) issued in euros by a low risk 
country. The judgement in the Russell v HSE case also distinguished between 
inflation-linked loss and wage-linked loss, with a lower discount rate to be applied 
to the latter as wages can be expected to increase at a faster rate than prices in the 
future. 
It is now five years on from that High Court judgement of Cross J. so it may 
be opportune to consider again the real rate available on ILGS as the real rate has 
changed over the intervening years. Also, the allowance for wage escalation should 
also be reviewed, as the ruling in that case was time limited:  
 
this Court is satisfied that the High Court judge’s downward adjustment of 
the real rate of return by 0.5 per cent to take account of future wage inflation, 
for the purpose of the calculation of the plaintiff’s claim for future wage 
inflation, was appropriate. He was clearly entitled to conclude that wage 
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inflation in general would, over the period of the loss, exceed CPI at a 
minimum of 1 per cent and that if no adjustment was made, the plaintiff 
would not receive full compensation. Further, given that wage inflation in 
the care sector would not fall into line with general wage inflation for a 
period of approximately five years, that being the opinion of Prof Walsh’s 
[expert witness called by plaintiff], he was entitled to reduce the adjustment 
required in the real rate of return to 0.5 per cent to take this factor into 
account.  
Quote from paragraph 155 in the Judgement of the Court of Appeal 
delivered by Ms Justice Irvine. 
 
Box 1 outlines how, in practice, the lump sum compensation for future loss is 
determined by Irish courts. 
 
Box 1: How Courts in Ireland Determine Lump Sum Compensation for 
Future Monetary Loss 
 
Damages for future monetary loss are generally computed using a “multiplicand” 
and a “multiplier”, with the quantum of loss found by multiplying the two 
figures. The multiplicand is the estimated monthly (or weekly or annual) loss 
and the multiplier is the capitalised value of a monthly (or weekly or annual) 
loss of €1. If expected losses are dependent on different contingencies, reoccur 
at different frequencies, or increase at different rates, then separate multipliers 
are computed for each category of loss and the overall capitalised amount is the 
sum of their products.  
 
The multiplicand 
In an injury case, the monetary loss would include loss of earnings and 
perquisites of employment, loss of pension benefits, additional healthcare and 
living expenses arising from injury. The onus is on the plaintiff to take reasonable 
measures to minimise the loss by, say, finding suitable alternative employment. 
Accordingly, the calculation is not strictly made on the actual loss but on the loss 
when minimised. This is qualified somewhat further as an Irish statutei stipulates 
that the hypothecated “loss” or better, the multiplicand, is not to be reduced by 
the proceeds of a contract of insurance or, in certain circumstances, by social 
insurance benefits payable, as a result of the wrongful action (presumably on the 
justification that plaintiffs provided for these latter benefits themselves).  
Sometimes precision is impossible in determining the loss sustained, such 
as the future loss of earnings for a child incapacitated by an accident long before 
their career path is clear. Even in these cases, the Irish courts generally impute a 
loss of earnings from when the child could have been expected to enter the 
workforce, to be capitalised with a suitable multiplier. 
432                                     The Economic and Social Review 
The loss of earnings and other losses determined above are all net of income tax, 
social insurance contributions or any other deductions that would have been 
payable by the plaintiff. The offsets are similarly the net receipts in the hand of 
the plaintiff.ii  
Say the court accepts, on the basis of evidence presented, that the plaintiff 
has suffered the following monetary loss in the future under different headings 
(all values in present day terms) 
1.    Cost of Employing a caregiver from now for life:         €1,000 per week  
2.    Loss of Earning from Age 21 to Age 68:                        €500 net per week  
3.    Loss of Pension from age 68 for remainder of life:        €250 net per week  
4.    Cost of Aids and Appliances (e.g. wheelchair, hoists, car adaptations) from 
now for life: €100 per week for life. 
 
The multiplier  
The multiplier to be applied to the multiplicand is to capitalise the loss of a  
€1 per week (or other frequency of the loss) over the total period of the loss. 
Specialist actuaries are retained to determine the multiplier and estimate the lump 
sum compensation for future loss. The actuary must make assumptions on: 
(i) The probability that each future payment is made. This typically requires 
assumptions on the mortality rates for the plaintiff, but it could involve 
other contingencies. 
(ii) The amount by which the net loss of €1 in present day terms might increase 
to by the time of payment. This assessment, in turn, typically requires 
assumptions on the general level of future inflation, the general level of 
real salary increases (that is salary increases above inflation), the 
probability that the salary level of the plaintiff might have changed other 
than by the general level as a result of, say, promotion. 
(iii) The discount rate that must be applied to each future payment so that its 
present value is determined. This is the assumed return from investing the 
lump sum. 
(iv) The rate and manner of taxation of income and capital gains in the future, 
both to determine the net future loss and the net proceeds from investing 
the compensating lump sum to replicate those net future losses. 
(v) Other assumptions, such as investment expenses, loss ceasing on contin -
gen cies other than death or reaching a certain age (such as on redundancy). 
 
Determining the Lump Sum 
Let us further assume in our example earlier that the plaintiff is a female currently 
ten years old. The precedent in such cases is that wage-linked loss is discounted 
at 1 per cent per annum and inflation-linked loss at 1.5 per cent per annum. So 
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the loss under headings 1-3 are discounted at 1 per cent per annum while the 
loss under heading 4 is discounted at 1.5 per cent per annum. Then, allowing for 
mortality using Irish Life Table 16 as is commonly used (see later), the actuary 
would calculate the following multiplier under each heading of loss: 
Multiplier  
1.     Capitalised Cost of Employing a caregiver for €1 per week  
        from now for life:                                                                              2,691  
2.     Capitalised Value of Loss of Earning of €1 per week  
        from Age 21 to Age 68:                                                                    1,718 
3.     Capitalised Value Loss of Pension for €1 per week  
        from age 68:                                                                                        430  
4.     Capitalised Cost of Aids and of €1 per week from now for life:    2,304 
  
Hence 
1.     Capitalised Cost of Employing caregiver from now  
        for life: €1,000 times 2,691 =                                                €2,691,000 
2.     Capitalised Value of Loss of Earning from   
        Age 21 to Age 68: €500 times 1,718 =                                    €859,000 
3.     Capitalised Value Loss of Pension from age 68:   
        €250 times 430 =                                                                      €107,500 
4.     Capitalised Cost of Aids from now for life:                                                 
        €100 times 2,304 =                                                                   €230,400                                                                                                          _________ 
Lump Sum to Compensate for Future Monetary Loss:                  €3,887,900                                                                                                          _________                                                                                                          _________ 
 
i  Section 2 of the Civil Liability (Amendment) Act, 1964; Social Welfare Consolidation Act 1993. 
ii Cooke v Walsh (1984) ILRM 208. 
 
 
IV DETERMINING THE REAL RETURN USING THE FAIR VALUE 
APPROACH AT THE PRESENT TIME 
 
It is not straightforward to construct a portfolio of assets, the proceeds of which 
will match the plaintiff’s future inflation-linked loss. Two problems arise in 
constructing such a portfolio to replicate future loss: 
 
(i) There are essentially no index-linked bonds linked to future inflation in Ireland.  
(ii) Index-linked bonds in countries that issue them do not span the maturity range 
needed to match the plaintiff’s loss which might continue for several decades. 
 
We treat each of these issues in turn. 
While the market of bonds with proceeds linked to inflation has not developed 
in Ireland, it has in other countries with the euro as their currency. In particular, 
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France, Germany and Italy have issued such bonds with inflation linked to Eurozone 
inflation (the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices excluding tobacco) and the 
market for index-linked bonds constitutes a growing part of the large euro-
denominated bond market. An Irish plaintiff can consider investing in such index-
linked bonds with no currency risk. The key risk with such an investment is how 
inflation across Europe might differ from Irish inflation in the future. 
Studies of how inflation differs in different regions with the same currency 
suggest that inflation rates do not differ very significantly over the long term 
(Whelan, 2005). So, for instance, when the Irish pound was linked to the UK pound 
from the political independence of Ireland at the end of 1921, to the breaking of 
the one-to-one parity between the currencies in early 1979, inflation in Ireland and 
the UK was very similar year-on-year, with accumulated differences of less than  
7 per cent over the entire 58-year period or, equivalently, less than 0.12 per cent 
per annum. More recently, inflation in Ireland can be compared to the Euro Area 
since the euro came into being. Inflation across the Eurozone has averaged almost 
the same from 2000 to the end of 2019, with annualised inflation of 1.6 per cent 
in Ireland, 1.7 per cent across the euro region, 1.5 per cent in Germany and  
1.4 per cent in France (see Figure 2). These similarities in inflation over the period 
are despite the boom and bust in Ireland over the last two decades, not unrelated to 
the low interest rates caused by the introduction of euro. 
 



















Source: OECD Database of National Consumer Price Indices, https://stats.oecd.org/ 
OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=PRICES_CPI&ShowOnWeb=true& 
Lang=en 
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Accordingly, it can be reasonably maintained that the average inflation rate in 
Ireland will be similar to the Eurozone inflation rate over the longer term. 
Furthermore, over such long periods it is not obvious which region would have 
slightly higher or slightly lower rates of inflation. While investing in bonds with 
payments linked to Eurozone inflation to match Irish inflation-linked cash flows 
does involve an element of risk, the risk is of an order of magnitude lower than the 
risk introduced by investing in equities or other securities. 
The strategy of investing in such Eurozone inflation-linked gilts is the  
optimum strategy of all possible strategies in the sense that it minimises the risk in 
replicating the lost inflation-linked cash flows to the plaintiff. It was accepted  
in the Gill Russell v Health Service Executive that ILGS issued in euros and  
linked to Eurozone inflation by France and others constituted the least risk 
investment portfolio. The overall size of the French Government’s outstanding 
ILGS debt as at end of 2018 was €220 billion. The overall size of the Eurozone 
Sovereign Inflation-Linked Bond market exceeds €660 billion.2 Note that inflation 
linkage is to the Euro Area Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices excluding 
tobacco. 
The longest dated stock linked to Euro Area inflation currently issued by France 
is to the year 2047 (Germany is to year 2046). So, at the present time, it not possible 
to construct a matching portfolio from existing index-linked stock to cover inflation-
linked losses extending from the calendar year 2047, which might be necessary if 
the plaintiffs’ losses are expected to continue beyond 2047. However, the associated 
investment risk can be minimised, as we now outline.  
The management agency of the French national debt, Agence France Trésor, 
undertakes to execute 10 per cent of its issuance programme each year with 
inflation-linked securities (Agence France Trésor, 2014). With other euro 
governments also issuing such securities, there will be a considerable ongoing 
supply of index-linked bonds linked to Euro Area inflation.  
An investment strategy to provide for the inflation-linked losses which fall after 
the calendar year 2047 consists of a number of steps. Step 1 is to invest that part of 
the lump sum that is deemed to meet the loss over these years in the 2047 dated 
French index-linked bond at the current real yield. Step 2 is to sell these index-
linked stock holdings and use the proceeds to buy longer dated index-linked stock 
when such longer dated bonds are issued. By this strategy, the duration of the 
portfolio can be extended, and longer-term losses matched over time. A feature of 
long-term interest rates or yields (whether real or nominal) is that such interest rates 
or yields generally show very little change from maturities of 30 years to 40 years 
and longer. This observation entails that, at the future time when a longer-dated 
stock is issued, the real yield that the plaintiff sells the 2047 stock at is very close 
to the real yield that he is simultaneously buying at. In short, he is in effect swapping 
two securities at a future unknown price – but we know that the prices will be very 
similar. In market parlance, it is “hedging the risk” of future price movements of 
the currently unavailable longer dated stock by investing temporarily in the 2047 
stock. 
The hedging strategy reduces the future reinvestment risk markedly but does 
not eliminate it altogether. There is a residual risk. If this residual risk were passed 
on to a third party, they would charge a risk premium for accepting it. It can be 
shown that following this investment strategy will lead to a gain to the plaintiff if 
real yields increase from current levels. Alternatively, if real yields fall from current 
levels then the plaintiff is exposed to a loss. However, it is the best strategy as it 
minimises the risk. 
The above considerations show that it is a straightforward matter to estimate 
the appropriate discount rate for inflation-linked loss to a plaintiff. Simply, estimate 
the average real yield on index-linked stock over the future term of the loss.  
Table 1 shows the real yields available on French sovereign ILGS over different 
future periods as at end October 2019.  
 
Table 1: Real Yields on selected French Index-Linked Gilts linked to Euro 
Inflation Index (excluding Tobacco) at End October 2019  
Term from Now                    Real Yield                           Stock  
 1 Years                               –1.6%                                 France OAT€i 2.25% 2020 
 5 Years                               –1.3%                                 France OAT€i 0.25% 2024 
11 Years                                –1.0%                                 France OAT€i 0.7% 2030 
21 Years                               –0.8%                                 France OAT€i 1.8% 2040  
28 Years                               –0.7%                                 France OAT€i 0.10% 2047  
Source: https://www.aft.gouv.fr/en/oateuroi-key-figures and prices and real yield 
calculations by Frankfurt Stock Exchange on 30 October 2019. See http://www.boerse-
frankfurt.de/en/bonds/.  
Note: Real yield on the German 0.10 per cent inflation-linked Federal bond 2015 (2046) is 
–1.1 per cent on 31 October 2019 See https://www.deutsche-finanzagentur.de/en/fact-
sheet/sheet-detail/productdata/sheet/DE0001030575/ and https://www.deutsche-finanz 
agentur.de/en/institutional-investors/federal-securities/inflation-linked-securities/ 
 
The real yield varies with the duration. As cerebral palsy claimants tend to have 
life expectancies of several decades, a gross real yield of the order of –0.75 per cent 
per annum appears reasonable to use, but it could be lower for those with short life 
expectancies. This real yield ignores portfolio management costs. An additional 
allowance of 0.25 per cent to 0.5 per cent per annum could be made for all costs 
associated with investment – advisory fees, trading costs, and management costs. 
Hence, at a conservative estimate, the net real yield to discount future inflation-
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linked loss is of the order of –1.0 per cent at the present time, after some allowance 
is made for the costs of implementing the investment strategy.3  
 
 
V DISCOUNT RATE FOR WAGE-LINKED LOSS 
 
It is important to distinguish between a wage-related loss and a price-related loss 
as wage and price indices have exhibited quite different characteristics over time 
since the industrial revolution. Over the last 200 years or so, wages have increased 
faster than inflation, a key factor leading to the dramatic rise of living standards of 
workers over time in Ireland, UK, Europe, US and the rest of the world. Rising real 
wages are generally attributed to the productivity gains unleashed since the 
industrial revolution which ensure that the same inputs of labour, resources and 
capital continue to produce more outputs over time. Labour, through increasing real 
wages, is rewarded for its part in the increase in productivity over time.  
In any event, there is overwhelming evidence that wages have increased faster 
than inflation in the past, in Ireland and elsewhere, and that it is appropriate to make 
allowance for such differences in the future. As mentioned earlier, an allowance to 
be made for increases in real wages in the future in Ireland was considered and 
ruled on in 2014 in the case Gill Russell v Health Service Executive, later upheld 
by the Court of Appeal. However, as was made clear in the judgements in that case, 
the long-term assumed real rate of wage increases was reduced to allow for the 
exigencies at that time.  
There are considerable data, national and international, to show the trends in 
real wages over long and short periods in the past. The Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) in Ireland has compiled and published wage or earnings or labour cost 
indices since the 1930s; other national statistics offices have done the same for their 
national economy; and bodies such as the International Labour Organisation have 
collected wage data by occupation around the world since 1924 (the “October 
Inquiry”). 
The CSO has published a historic analysis of wage trends in Ireland from 1938 
to 2015 (CSO, 2017), in aggregate and broken down by industries and sectors, 
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3 The allowance for such costs was considered recently in the UK in the Government Actuary’s advice to 
the Lord Chancellor on the personal discount rate (Government Actuary UK, 2019, see pp. 50-53). Table 9 
(p. 52) of this report suggests an adviser fee of 0.25 per cent to 0.5 per cent p.a., fund manager fees of  
0.25 per cent to 0.5 per cent p.a., and platform fees of 0.1 per cent to 0.2 per cent p.a. Including an allowance 
for tax of 0.0 per cent to 0.5 per cent, the UK Government Actuary advised an overall allowance of  
0.75 per cent per annum.  Subsequently, the Lord Chancellor in his reasons for adopting the new –0.25 per 
cent discount rate for personal injury claims in the England and Wales agreed with the Government Actuary’s 
advice on such charges, stating that “...the Government Actuary’s conclusion that a figure of plus 0.75 per 
cent for tax and expenses is a reasonable one” (paragraph 13).  Accordingly, the 0.25 per cent p.a. allowance 
suggested above for Irish cases is at the lower end of what was recently suggested and adopted in the UK.
occupations, age, and gender. This publication records that real earnings in  
Ireland (that is, earnings above inflation) grew by an average of 1.9 per cent per 
annum over the 77 years ending 2015. It varied by decade, ranging from a low of 
0.9 per cent real per annum in the 1980s to a high of 4.8 per cent real per annum in 
the 1970s. The gender pay gap for women in the industrial sector (the only one 
recorded for such a length of time) fell from 44 per cent in 1943 to 23 per cent in 
2014, meaning that the real rate of increase in women’s wages in this sector was 
greater than for men over this period.  
 


















Source: Data from CSO average weekly earnings data for each year under all industries 
category (CSO, 2017). This comprises all industrial occupations working in the 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying, transportable goods, and electricity, water and waste 
sectors. The mean annual increase was 1.9 per cent. 
 
The rate of the increase in real earnings in Ireland also varies by sector and 
occupation. In Table 2, we take an abstract from Table 3.1 in CSO (2017) that 
highlights how real increases in wages varied by occupation over the 30 years 
ending 2015.  
However, there are issues when applying such historic wage or earnings indices 
to estimate the actual wage increases experienced by an individual throughout their 
working life or for the cost of specialised labour services, such as caregivers. Trends 
in wage indices might not be reliable for four reasons: 
(a) First, the composition of general earnings or wage indices might be different 
to the required occupation.  


























































(b) Second, the composition of the wage index might change over time so, say, 
greater weight is given to newer occupations with different skills over time.  
(c) Third, there can be changes to the skills demanded over time, even in 
occupations with the same title, so the index is not comparing like-with-like 
over time.  
(d) Fourth, often there are inconsistencies in how the data are collected over time 
in respect of bonuses, pension, holiday pay, and other benefits of working.  
 
These issues tend to be compounded when making international comparisons due 
to currency differences and the possibility that the same job title might not 
correspond to the same work in different countries.  
Academic studies of real wage trends over long period are often structured to 
remove distortions found in general wage indices. Typically, such studies follow 
wages in one occupation that has altered little over the very long term (and also 
their experienced inflation by following the change in prices and composition of 
the wage-earners consumption basket). Detailed accounts have often been kept of 
building projects (such as universities or cathedrals), which allow academics to 
study the long-term trends in skilled (e.g. carpenters) and unskilled labourers wages 
over time. Clark (2005), for instance, traces the real wage trends for such workers 
in England for 800 years (1209 to 2004), using some 46,000 wage observations 
and 110,000 price observations and shows, since the industrial revolution, wages 
have persistently increased at a higher rate than inflation.  
Clark (2005) reports that the annualised real wage increase for craftsmen 
(labourers) was 1.3 per cent (1.4 per cent) over the two hundred years since 1805, 
1.4 per cent (1.6 per cent) over the last hundred years, 2.1 per cent (2.1 per cent) 
since 1945, 2.7 per cent (2.4 per cent) since 1965 and 2.0 per cent (1.8 per cent) 
since 1985. Similar findings have been found when studying construction workers 
real wages in European cities (Allen, 2008) and for wages in the United Kingdom 
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Table 2: Real Average Weekly Earnings in the Industry Sector by 
Occupational Group in Ireland, 1985-2015  
                                                                    Real average weekly earnings (€)  
Year                                                Managerial &      Clerical, Sales         Production & 
                                                        Professional     & Service Workers        Machinery  
1985                                                     801.16                 506.08                    450.34 
2015                                                   1,451.89                 754.51                    685.53 
Real Increase per annum,  
  1985-2015                                         2.0%                     1.3%                       1.4%  
Source: Figures for real average earnings sourced from Table 3.1 in CSO (2017). The 
industry sector comprises all working in the manufacturing, mining and quarrying, 
transportable goods, and electricity, water and waste sectors. 
(see for instance Feinstein, 1995, which includes wages in Ireland prior to 1920). 
Indeed, there is a considerable body of evidence that real wages have averaged 
between 1 per cent and 2 per cent above inflation over long periods in the past. 
Whelan (2002) traces the long history of the wages for carpenters in Ireland over 
the twentieth century and shows that, over long periods, the average has been 
between 1 per cent and 2 per cent over inflation.  
There is an important point to be made about the results of calculating real 
increases in wages over long periods of time. Put simply, the average real wage rise 
from different occupations tend to converge to a very similar annualised rate as the 
time period increases. So, in the long term, despite different wage levels and 
differing wage trends in the short term, the average increase in real wages for skilled 
and unskilled men are seen to converge over time. To illustrate why this is the case 
mathematically, consider Occupation A and Occupation B, with the renumeration 
from Occupation A being, say, 75 per cent of that of Occupation B. Let us further 
say that after a period of 50 years that the renumeration for both occupations is the 
same. This means that the wage rate for Occupation A increased faster than 
Occupation B, by an accumulated 33 per cent over the 50 years. This translates to 
an annualised increase of 0.58 per cent. So the annualised rate of the wage increase 
of Occupation A is just 0.58 per cent higher than that of Occupation B, and this 
annualised difference will fall as the time period increases. In short, there is a 
common main driver affecting both wage series that, over time, dominates over 
any (reasonable) change in relative wages levels. Hence, the annualised rate of 
increase of both wage series converge to the same value as the time period increases.  
An analysis of historic wages in Ireland over the last hundred years or so shows 
that wages increased faster than inflation over any long-term period. The 
relationship has varied in the past, by period studied, by sector, by occupation, and 
by gender. However, across all these variables, it is a fair assessment to summarise 
the historic statistics as showing that wages exceeded inflation by an average of 
between 1 per cent and 2 per cent per annum over periods of several decades. Trends 
in real wages in the past are not unique to Ireland – similar trends have been 
observed in most economies in the world (see, for instance, Officer and Williamson, 
2012, or Williamson, 1992, and earlier cited sources). It appears reasonable to 
conclude that wage escalation has been about 1.5 per cent higher than general price 
inflation over the long-term past in Ireland. 
Arguments have been advanced by some economists, notably Gordon (2016), 
suggesting that productivity improvements in the past are difficult to maintain in 
the future and recent trends are giving warning signs. However, there is somewhat 
of a consensus that real wage increases in Ireland over the long-term future will be 
similar to the long-term past according to long-term forecasters. The Actuarial 
Review of The Social Insurance Fund assumes that wages will increase at an 
average of about 1.5 per cent per annum above inflation over the next several 
decades (Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, 2017; 
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Department of Social Protection, 2012). Other projections assume salaries will tend 
to rise by 2 per cent real per annum over the long term (e.g. Pensions Board, 2005; 
2006). Assumptions regarding the real rate of increase in staff nurse wages in the 
long term were made in Appendix 8 (pp. 191-240) in Report of the Public Service 
Benchmarking Body (2007). In this actuarial report, the actuary pointed out that 
“both historic trends and economic projections point to pay increases of 2 per cent 
p.a. above inflation” (p. 210) and, in addition to these general pay increases, staff 
nurses would have, on average, promotional increases of about 0.8 per cent per 
annum (p. 214). In a less comprehensive but more up-to-date report, the Report of 
the Public Service Pay Commission May 2017, suggest that general pay increases 
could reasonably be modelled as 1 per cent above inflation (p. 100) increased with 
allowances for promotional increases, which for nurses appear to be about 0.5 per 
cent per annum (see commentary on p.105).  
These assumptions are in line with actuarial practice in countries such as the 
UK and US where allowance is typically made that wages will increase faster than 
inflation over the long-term future, generally by between 1 per cent and 2 per cent 
per annum (e.g. see actuarial valuations of social security or public service pension 
schemes in these countries). Courts in these jurisdictions have also had to decide 
on what is a reasonable allowance to make for future real earnings increases. The 
Guernsey Court of Appeal and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have 
considered this issue in depth recently in the matter of Helmont v Simon [Privy 
Council Appeal No. 0064 of 2011]. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
upheld the decision that the economic evidence justified a differential between price 
and wage inflation of 2 per cent. 
Assuming real wages increase at +1.5 per cent per annum on average over the 
long-term future, then the discount rate used in capitalising wage-linked loss in 
Irish courts should be –2.5 per cent (that is –0.75 per cent for inflation-linked losses, 
reduced by 0.25 per cent to allow for portfolio managements costs and reduced by 
a further 1.5 per cent to allow for the real increase in wages).  
 
 
VI LONGEVITY RISK 
 
Each future payment will be made only if the injured party is then alive, so a 
mortality basis is needed to estimate the survival probability. Accordingly, the part 
of the lump sum to compensate for future loss is dependent not only on the discount 
rate but also on the mortality basis assumed.  
Longevity risk is the risk that the plaintiff will live longer or shorter than 
expected (and thus be under- or over-compensated). Longevity risk can usefully be 
decomposed into three distinct components. First, the mortality basis or life table 
give average rates of survival for a group. So, even assuming the life table is correct, 
applying any life table to one individual in the group gives rise to random error, as 
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that particular individual may be the one who dies later or earlier than average. 
Second, determining the appropriate life table for a group, such as the male or 
female population of Ireland, requires actuarial judgement as, amongst other things, 
it involves projecting mortality rates into the long-term future. Third, the plaintiff 
will typically differ from an average person due to injury and disabilities, so 
adjustment is required to the life table of the average person. Typically, expert 
medical opinion is sought by the courts on this third issue to determine what 
reduction to normal life expectancy, if any, is required for the particular impairments 
of the plaintiff.  
It is possible to estimate statistically the extent of the random error in applying 
a group average to an individual. It is also possible to give an indication of the size 
of the risk in projecting mortality rates for the population of Ireland. However, the 
third risk is obviously specific to the individual’s impairments so can only be done, 
if at all, on a case-by-case basis.  
The Central Statistics Office (CSO) publishes life tables for the Irish population 
following each census. The most recent life table is Irish Life Table 16 based on 
the mortality experience observed over the calendar years 2010 to 2012. These 
tables give a period life expectancy at birth of 78.4 years for males and 82.8 years 
for females. These population tables are frequently used as the mortality basis in 
estimating the present value of future loss court cases in Ireland (Whelan, 2009).  
However, period life expectancies do not give a measure of how long a person 
will live because, as the CSO states: “Period expectation of life… is therefore not 
the number of years someone of that age could actually expect to live because death 
rates are likely to change in the future” (CSO, 2015). The cohort life expectancy 
directly addresses the issue of how long a person can be expected to live as it 
estimates life expectancy not from historic mortality rates but from the (projected) 
mortality rates the person can be expected to experience as they go through life. 
So, for instance, a new-born in calendar year 2020 will be aged 60 years in calendar 
year 2080, so in estimating the cohort life expectancy, the current mortality rate of 
a 60-year-old is adjusted to reflect how that mortality rate is expected to change 
over the next 60 calendar years. The resultant projected mortality rates are used in 
the calculation of the cohort life expectancy. There is generally a significant 
difference between the life expectancies calculated using the two different 
approaches, with the cohort life expectancy greater than the period life expectancy 
as mortality rates are forecast to continue to decline in the future. 
The CSO projects future mortality rates for the population of Ireland as part of 
an exercise in population and labour force projections undertaken following each 
census (CSO, 2018). These projected mortality rates are widely used by actuaries 
and others (e.g. in estimating public and private pension liabilities) and can be used 
to estimate cohort life expectancies. Full details of the approach used by the CSO 
and of alternative approaches are given in Naqvi and Whelan (2019), together with 
a table of cohort life expectancies in Ireland. The cohort life expectancy for a  
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new-born in Ireland in calendar year 2020 is 90.4 years for a male and 92.7 years 
for female – some 15 per cent and 12 per cent respectively higher than period life 
expectancies according to Irish Life Table 16. 
Figure 4 graphs the probability that a male born in 2020 will survive to each 
age and the probability of death in each year of age using the most recent mortality 
projection basis of the CSO.  
 
Figure 4: Probability that a New-Born Male in Ireland in 2020 will Die at 

















Source: Authors’ calculations following the methodology employed by the Central Statistics 
Office (CSO, 2018). For details see Naqvi and Whelan (2019). The cohort life table on 
which the graph is based is shown in Appendix 1. 
 
When an increasing number of similar lives are grouped together, then the average 
lifetime of the group converges to the life expectancy. However, when considering 
an individual life, one must consider the distribution of the age at death as shown 
in Figure 4. The distribution is negatively skewed, so the mean will be lower than 
the median. This is a typical feature in human life tables, both period and cohort, 
with for instance the life expectancy (the mean) of Irish Life Table 16 being  
78.4 years for a male at birth but the median being 81.4 years.  
The negative skewness of the distribution of the age of death, illustrated in 
Figure 4, is an important consideration when mortality tables are used to estimate 
the lump sum to compensate a plaintiff for future loss. The cohort life expectancy 
for a male in Ireland is 90.4 years but the probability that the individual will live 
longer than 90.4 years is 66 per cent, from the cohort life table tabulated in 
Appendix 1. Accordingly, a lump sum calculated based on the life expectancy will 
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be adequate for only 34 per cent of individuals. Therefore, the funds available from 
this lump sum will run out for the majority before they die. 
A better alternative to basing the term of the loss on the remaining life 
expectancy of the plaintiff is to set an explicit probability (or confidence level) that 
the plaintiff will be adequately compensated. We can then, using the life table, 
determine the corresponding duration of the loss. So, for instance, if the probability 
that the plaintiff is not undercompensated is set at, say, 0.5 (and therefore a 
corresponding 0.5 probability of not overcompensated) then we simply solve for 
the age in the life table for the term of the loss that matches this probability. This is 
shown in Figure 4, where the probability is selected on the right-hand scale at 0.5 
and then we find at what age the survival probability is equal to the given 
probability. This is can done at various probability levels. Table 3 gives the results 
at selected levels for both males and females.  
 
Table 3: Duration of Lifetime Loss (in years) of a New-Born in 2020 at 
Different Confidence Levels to Ensure Not Undercompensated Compared 
with Life Expectancy  
               Life Expectancy                                Probability Not Undercompensated  
                      (Mean)                   50% (Median)            75%                90%            95%  
Male               90.4                             94.8                    98.6                100.8          102.1 
Female           92.7                             96.2                    99.6                101.7          103.0  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the cohort life tables in Appendix 1. 
 
Applying this approach, we can calculate the lump sum required to compensate the 
individual plaintiff with any associated degree of confidence. Annuity and annuity-
certain values are calculated at various discount rates and presented in Figure 5. 
The exercise shows that estimating the loss at the 75 per cent confidence level rather 
than estimating it using a life annuity increases the present value of the loss by  
21 per cent for a new-born male when the discount rate is –2.5 per cent. At the  
90 per cent confidence level and a discount rate of –2.5 per cent, the increased loss 
above the life annuity approach is 29 per cent for a new-born male. Similar 
increases are observed for females. 
The above methodology allows us to make explicit allowance for the longevity 
risk arising from random fluctuations in lifetimes. However, it still leaves the risk 
that the cohort life table employed differs from actual mortality that the new-borns 
in 2020 will experience in the future. The CSO expert group bases the cohort life 
table on its best estimate of future mortality improvements. However, these 
forecasts cannot be expected to be that reliable as they involve forecasting the path 
of mortality improvements for a hundred years and more. It is difficult to forecast 
medical advances (e.g. antibiotics) or pandemics (e.g. Spanish Flu) which in the 
past have had a significant impact on mortality rates, either permanently or 
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temporarily. In fact, official forecasts of life expectancies in Ireland and elsewhere 
have tended to be too conservative, with actual improvements exceeding those 
forecast (Keilman, 2008; Waldron, 2005; Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002). This tendency 
to underestimation is largely due to forecasters predicting a levelling off or 
slowdown in the rate of mortality improvements while rates of improvement tended, 
in actuality, to increase in most countries at least until 2011 (Navqi and Whelan, 
2019). 
The CSO does not give confidence bounds around its central estimate that 
might give an indication of the inherent uncertainty associated with its projections. 
However, the Population Division of the United Nations (UN) does forecast period 
life expectancies at birth for Ireland (and for every other country in the world), 
together with 80 per cent and 95 per cent prediction bounds for each calendar year 
2020 to 2100 (UN, 2015). From the UN period life expectancies, Whelan and Naqvi 
(2020) derive consistent cohort life expectancies for Ireland with 80 per cent and 
95 per cent prediction bounds. These are shown in Table 4. 
446                                     The Economic and Social Review 
Figure 5: Increase in Present Value of an Annuity Certain with Different 
Confidence Levels above a Life Annuity, for a New-Born Male in Ireland in 



































–3.0% –2.5% –2.0% –1.5% –1.0% –0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
Life Expectancy 50% Confidence Levels 75% Confidence Levels
90% Confidence Levels 95% Confidence Levels
Discount Rate
Table 4: Male and Female Projected Cohort Life Expectancies in Ireland for 
New-Born in 2020, with 50%, 80% and 95% Prediction Intervals Consistent 
with UN 2019 Forecasts (Including CSO 2018 Projection).  
                      Lower           Lower         Median       CSO 2018        Upper          Upper 
                        95%              80%                              Projection          80%             95%  
Male                83.9              86.0             89.7               90.4               93.4             95.2 
Female             86.8              88.8             92.5               92.7               95.9             97.3  
Source: Figures sourced from Table 1 in Whelan and Naqvi (2020). 
 
The figures in Table 4 are, naturally, subject to future revision as they depend on 
the historic data-driven Bayesian hierarchical model used by the UN, which will 
change with new data (Raftery et al., 2014). In short, the figures in Table 4 are  
best viewed as indicative only as it is not possible to be precise about our 
uncertainty over the future course of mortality improvements. Comparing Table 4 
with Table 3 suggests that random error associated with applying an average cohort 
life table to an individual tends to be more significant than estimation errors 
associated with cohort life expectancies. 
Finally, adjustments must be made to the cohort life table so that allowance is 
made for any increased mortality risk to the plaintiff due to their particular 
impairments. This adjustment often introduces considerably more uncertainty (and 
therefore risk) as the studies supporting any adjustment are based on relatively small 
and heterogenous groups. In cases of cerebral palsy, experts to Irish courts often 
rely on the percentage reduction to average population life expectancy estimated 
in a study of a Californian database of persons with cerebral palsy over a 28-year 
period (Brooks et al., 2014). This study has considerably less than 20,000 subjects 
at each age, and sub-divides this number further into ten subgroups based on motor 
skills and feeding skills and then further sub-divides each subgroup by sex. 
Inevitably, the sub-divisions ignore commonly associated cognitive and sensory 
impairments – important factors known to affect mortality rates such as IQ level 
and vision (e.g. Hutton et al., 2000; 2006; Hemming et al., 2005; Blair et al., 2001). 
The key point is that the adjustment to be made to the population life table to allow 
for the mortality impact of the plaintiff’s impairments is often an issue where 
evidence is scant and experts can reasonably differ, especially as some mortality 
impacts might be ameliorated by future care structures which are dependent on the 
eventual settlement. 
There is large uncertainty associated with when an individual will die. The 
sources of error – the random error associated with the age of death of an individual 
subject to a life table and the estimation errors in determining the life table – add 
to the difficulty the plaintiff has in devising a draw-down strategy to ensure s/he 
will not outlive their financial resources. The analysis in this section is of practical 
significance to the plaintiff in designing a drawdown strategy so that, with an 
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acceptable degree of certainty, the money will not be exhausted before the plaintiff 
dies.  
The mortality basis frequently used for capitalising future loss in Ireland to date 
is the most recent period life table of population, adjusted as necessary by medical 
opinion on the reduction in life expectancy of the plaintiff. The loss is capitalised 
using a life annuity. As we have shown, this approach tends to undercompensate 
the plaintiff in two ways. First, cohort rather than period life tables should be used. 
The resultant cohort life expectancy tends to be 10 per cent to 15 per cent higher 
than the period life expectancy, the exact uplift depending on sex and age. Second, 
life expectancies or life annuities should not be used in capitalising the loss, as the 
individual has a probability greater than 50 per cent of outliving the average life 
expectancy. To be, say, 75 per cent confident that the plaintiff will not live longer 
than allowed for in the loss calculations requires a further material increase to the 
lump sum. For a new-born in Ireland in 2020 the increase is marginally above  
20 per cent using a discount rate of –2.5 per cent.  
 
 
VII PERIODIC PAYMENTS ORDERS 
 
The earlier sections highlight the difficulties in converting a lump sum award into 
a future stream of income that match the expected future outgoings for care costs 
and other loss. Investing in the least risk portfolio of index-linked gilts still leaves 
the plaintiff with (i) the small basis risk that Irish inflation will diverge from 
Eurozone inflation, (ii) the reinvestment risk which arises when future proceeds 
must buy future longer term index-linked bonds that are currently unavailable, and, 
(iii) the risk that future wage increases will exceed the annual average allowed for 
of 1.5 per cent. Added to those risks must be the significant uncertainty in estimating 
how long the plaintiff will survive, considered in the previous section. The judiciary 
in Ireland have long pointed out that due to these difficulties it is an impossible task 
to determine an award fair to both parties, or, in the words of Mr Justice Irvine:  
 
To state that the current law in this jurisdiction, which requires the court to 
award a lump sum intended to compensate the plaintiff for all past and future 
losses, and in particular future pecuniary loss, is inherently fallible and unjust 
cannot be disputed. It is also grossly outdated by reference to the approach 
now adopted by the courts in other Common Law and Civil Law 
jurisdictions. 
[Judgement of Court of Appeal, Russell v HSE, 2015] 
 
The Irish judiciary would welcome a change in the law so that redress for future 
loss could be made by way of periodic payments over the future lifetime of the 
plaintiff. The Law Reform Commission (1996) and the Working Group on Medical 
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Negligence and Periodic Payments (2010) called for such reform to bring the 
system in Ireland in line with the UK, US, Canada, Australia and other EU 
countries. As noted earlier, the law was amended in Ireland so from October 2018 
claims for catastrophic injury could be part settled by annual payments for the 
remainder of plaintiff’s lifetime. Here a catastrophic injury is defined as one where 
the plaintiff is permanently disabled and needs to receive lifelong care (Civil 
Liability (Amendment) Act 2017). This mode of settlement, known as a Periodic 
Payment Order (PPO), was targeted to meet the growing number of cerebral palsy 
claims against the HSE. In fact, the SCA pioneered “interim” PPOs from 2010, in 
anticipation of such legislation being put in place for compensation by final PPOs. 
However, just 13 months later the High Court ruled that, as drafted, the legislation 
did not allow full compensation and therefore “no judge charged with protecting 
plaintiffs’ best interests could recommend such a scheme” [Judgement in Jack 
Hegarty v HSE 2015/10520P]. At the time of that judgement in November 2019, 
the SCA had 83 such catastrophic injury cases where liability has been admitted 
awaiting final PPO or lump sum settlements.4  
PPOs once decided by the court are not subject to review in the future in any 
jurisdiction where they have been introduced, no matter how the needs of the 
plaintiff subsequently change. However, the payments themselves increase at a pre-
agreed rate of indexation. The flaw in the legislation introducing periodic payments 
in Ireland relates to the indexation applied to the regular payments. All payments 
for loss of wages, cost of care, cost of medical treatments and aids must be indexed 
with the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for Ireland. This is, of course,  
an inflation measure, which can be expected to lag wage increases by about  
1.5 per cent per annum (see earlier). The consequence of indexing at inflation when 
a wage rate index is more appropriate is manifest in the long term from 
compounding the differences: inflation-linked payments are less than half wage-
linked costs after 50 years (assuming an annualised differential of 1.5 per cent).  
The rate of indexation of the PPO was obviously a key issue when drafting the 
legislation. The Working Group on Medical Negligence and Periodic Payments 
(2010) had make a key recommendation in this regard: 
 
Provision within the legislation must be made for adequate and appropriate 
indexation of periodic payments as an essential prerequisite for their 
introduction as an appropriate form of compensation. In particular, the Group 
recommends the introduction of earnings and costs-related indices which 
will allow periodic payments to be index-linked to the levels of earnings of 
treatment and care personnel and to changes in costs of medical and assistive 
aids and appliances. This will ensure that plaintiffs will be able to afford the 
cost of treatment and care into the future. Executive Summary, p.8. 
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4 Irish Times, 19 November 2019, “Medical Negligence cases set to cost record €374 million next year”.
However, when it came to drafting the legislation, the Report of the Working 
Group on Legislation on Periodic Payment Orders (2015) recommended the index 
should be the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for Ireland (HICP), influenced 
by an actuarial report commissioned by the SCA (Towers Watson, 2014).5 The 
Working Group erroneously state that the actuarial report suggests indexation of 
the plaintiff’s annual award at HICP plus a fixed percentage of 0.5 per cent “to take 
account of wage increases” (see p. 23 and also p. 21). The actuarial report, 
Feasibility study on the introduction of PPOs in Ireland, models the “indexation 
matching the claimant needs” – including wage inflation and range up to bespoke 
medical and living support care cost inflation – at HICP plus 1½ per cent per annum. 
In short, the Towers Watson report agrees that the appropriate indexation is best 
modelled at inflation plus 1.5 per cent per annum. This actuarial report also shows 
that introducing PPOs, whether indexed by inflation or a wage index, can be 
expected to increase market premiums (p. 53) and the cost of claims with 
“significant potential solvency issues for insurers” (p. 5). This is consistent with 
our findings earlier that lump sum compensation is currently reckoned on a basis 
that is lower than the fair value. 
It is a simple matter to amend the legislation so that the indexation of PPOs is 
either determined by the courts (as in the UK, which deems a wage index 
appropriate) or a suitable wage index maintained by the CSO. Perhaps one obstacle 
to this simple remedy is that, if currently implemented, it would have a significant 
financial impact on the State. PPOs are simply a secure future series of payments 
rising in line with wages or some other index over some period. It is possible to 
put a market value on such a stream of future payments. The market value of the 
PPO, as developed earlier, is considerably greater than the lump sum award 
currently made by the courts. We may term the difference as the PPO uplift – the 
value of the PPO is higher than the value that the claim is currently settling. So the 
State is unlikely to amend the indexation in the current PPO legislation as long as 
the courts maintain a higher discount rate to capitalise future loss to a lump sum 
than the ruling market rate. 
We can estimate the impact of the PPO uplift on the State’s current outstanding 
liability to clinical and general claims. Section V showed that, consistent with legal 
principles in Ireland, the annualised discount rate for future wage-linked loss should 
be –2.5 per cent (broken down as –0.75 per cent p.a. real yield on index-linked 
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5 The Working Group decided that it should specify the index in the legislation and not leave it up to the 
courts to decide (as it was in the UK where a wage index had been adopted by the courts). In making this 
decision, the Working Group (comprising of senior members of the SCA, Department of Finance and other 
public servants) expressed itself guided by the interests of the defendants, or in the words of the Report: 
“the Working Group did not favour leaving the choice of index to the discretion of the court as it could 
introduce a high degree of uncertainty as to potential financial liabilities both for the State and for the 
insurance industry ... the index chosen should provide as much certainty as possible for defendants in terms 
of projected increases in their financial liabilities” (Report of the Working Group on Legislation on Periodic 
Payment Orders, 2015, p.19).
stock, reduced by c. 0.25 per cent p.a. for investment charges, and reduced by a 
further 1.5 per cent p.a. to allow for the real rate of salary escalation). Currently 
awards by the courts are discounting future losses at between +1 per cent per annum 
(for wage loss) and +1.5 per cent per annum (for inflation-linked loss).  
Now a simple but very crude estimate would be to note that the estimated total 
liability to the State jumped by 17 per cent in 2015 when the discount rate changed 
from 3 per cent to between 1.5 per cent and 1 per cent following the ruling in the 
Russell v HSE case as detailed in the Background section. If a change of between 
1.5 per cent to 2 per cent in the interest rate leads to a 17 per cent increase in the 
liability then a change of 3.5 per cent (that is from +1 per cent to –2.5 per cent) 
might lead to an increase of double 17 per cent, that is about a one-third increase. 
A one-third increase to the outstanding liability of €3.15 billion is just over  
€1 billion. This estimate can be expected to underestimate the true figure as present 
values rise faster than linearly as discount rates fall.  
A better estimate is to consider the weighted average duration of the loss. The 
present value of the loss depends on the duration of the loss. Figure 6 graphs the 
present value against the term of the loss at either discount rate and highlights the 
factor by which the present value increases when moving from a discount rate of 
+1.0 per cent to –2.5 per cent. 
 
Figure 6: Present Value of an Annuity Certain of 1 per annum at Discount 
Rate of –2.5% and +1.0% (LHS) and Percentage Increase in Present Value 



















Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Now if a change in the discount rate from 3 per cent to between 1.5 per cent 
and 1.0 per cent increases the aggregate liability by 17 per cent, then, with some 
elementary computation, we can estimate that the weighted average duration of 
loss is between 17 and 24 years. Knowing the duration of the loss allows us  
to estimate the effect of any change in discount rate, as illustrated in Figure 6.  
The change in discount rate from between 1.5 per cent and 1.0 per cent down to  
–2.5 per cent when the duration of the loss is between 17 and 24 years entails an 
increase of between 33 per cent to 66 per cent. This in turn equates to an increase 
of between €1 billion to €2 billion on outstanding liabilities of €3.15 billion. These 
estimates are crude, but it does give a measure of the State’s financial inertia to 
introducing PPOs. In short, it is difficult to envisage the State amending the PPOs 
legislation with any urgency when claims against it are currently settling for a 
fraction of their market value. An incentive for the State to settle by lump sum 
instead of appropriately indexed PPOs will persist as long as the discount rates for 





Damages inflicted by wrongful or negligent acts can, aside from pain and suffering, 
be pictured as a series of future costs or losses stretching for the remaining lifetime 
of the plaintiff, generally rising in line with inflation or wages in the economy. The 
most appropriate way to compensate the plaintiff is, obviously, to replace that 
stream of losses with periodic payments that match the amount and rate of increase 
of the loss. Such simple redress schemes are an important part of tort law in many 
jurisdictions in the world including the UK, US, and many EU countries. 
Legislation to achieve this end has not been satisfactorily introduced in Ireland. 
This paper suggests that one reason for such delay is that lump sum compensation 
in lieu of such future payments is, and has been, considerably lower than the market 
value of the stream of payments. Simply, the State which, directly or indirectly is 
a defendant in many such cases, is financially incentivised to delay any legislation 
until the lump sum awards are increased to the market value of future loss. 
This paper demonstrates that the stakes are high when a change is made in how 
compensation is calculated. First, the discount rate applied to future loss should be 
reduced to bring it in line with legal precedent and current market conditions, from 
+1.5 per cent per annum to –1.0 per cent per annum for inflation-linked loss and 
from +1.0 per cent per annum to –2.5 per cent per annum for wage-linked loss. 
Second, the lump sum award should no longer be capitalised using the life annuity 
approach commonly used to date. Instead, to allow appropriately for longevity risk, 
the lump sum award should be calculated by way of an annuity-certain, the term 
set so that the plaintiff is not expected to live longer than their compensation allows 
with a pre-specified degree of confidence. Finally, the mortality basis used, before 
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adjustment for the plaintiff’s life-shortening impairments, should be a cohort 
mortality basis incorporating likely changes in mortality rates over the lifetime of 
the plaintiff.  
The changes if applied to capitalising the loss would have a significant impact 
on the quantum of awards, increasing with increasing term of the loss. Changing 
the mortality basis from a period to cohort approach can be expected to increase 
the term of the loss by about 10 per cent to 15 per cent. Changing how the term of 
the loss is estimated, from a life expectancy or life annuity approach to the annuity 
certain with pre-specified confidence level, can increase the term by a further  
20 per cent or more. Changing the discount rate can be expected to have the biggest 
impact, increasing the award by more than one-third if the term exceeds 17 years, 
and more than double that if it exceeds 25 years (see Figure 6). Such changes, we 
estimate, will increase the State’s liability to existing outstanding claims against it 
by more than €1 billion, and perhaps closer to €2 billion. 
Despite the large sums involved, there are only losers when the comes to 
medical negligence cases. The plaintiff suffers a reduced quality of life, a suffering 
shared by parents and family of catastrophically damaged infants. Medical and 
other hospital staff are demoralised (Murphy, 2018). After the trauma of the incident 
itself follows the prolonged litigation process, giving years of stress and anxiety to 
all, and involving considerable work by legal teams and experts on either side. The 
State Claims Agency reports that the monetary costs associated with the legal 
process in clinical claims amounted to €67 million in 2018 while the awards for 
that year were €180 million (NTMA Annual Report and Accounts 2018, p. 44). 
The State is perhaps misdirecting its attention in trying to reduce the size of 
each claim rather than reduce the number of claims. Tort law ideally should deter 
wrongful behaviour through the award of damages. Over the last decade there have 
been many incidences where the Irish courts have been satisfied that the standard 
of care in the maternity unit was unacceptably deficient in a manner that led to the 
injuries and compensation must be paid. Over the last decade there have also been 
several investigations into the operation of maternity services in Ireland, all 
highlighting significant scope for improvement. Helps et al. (2020), in a review of 
the ten national enquiries into maternity services Ireland between 2005 and 2018, 
report that all ten recommend staffing levels and staff training be increased and 
nine of them recommend the need for better risk management practices, 
recommendations reiterated again in the most recent review of maternity services 
(Health Information and Quality Authority, 2020). Whelan and Hally (2020) show 
that the rise of claims settlements has been so dramatic over the decade that more 
is now being paid out by way of claims against the maternity services than is 
actually spent in delivering the services and suggest that spending more on 
maternity services might be cost saving in the long run. A way must be found to 
ensure the HSE prioritises the reforms to the maternity services so obviously needed 
– be it by funding maternity services separately to ensure adequate staffing and 
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training, or by making the budget contingent on reform. Also, the Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform, under whose remit this falls, should oversee the 
reform in maternity services and determine its separate budget.  
The stakes are also high in non-pecuniary terms when the discount rate and 
appropriate approach to allow for longevity risk is contested in the Irish courts. For 
the judiciary, setting a discount rate in line with current market conditions and 
appropriately apportioning longevity risk would remove a key obstacle preventing 
the modernising of our system to allow compensation by life contingent periodic 
payments. For maternity and other clinical services, it could be the tipping point 
when the sums paid out by way of settlements for mismanagement become 
appreciably larger than the additional costs of operating a sound system. For the 
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
Cohort Life Table for Male and Females born in Ireland in 2020 based on 
CSO Mortality Projection Basis  
                                           Male                                                    Female                
Year   Age     Mortality  Probability  Probability     Mortality    Probability Probability 
                        Rate         of New-        of New            Rate          of New-       of New- 
                                         born in        born in                              born in        born in  
                                      2020 Dying      2020                            2020 Dying      2020 
                                          in Year       Surviving                            in Year       Surviving  
                                                            to End of                                              to End of 
                                                                Year                                                      Year  
2020      0      0.00334      0.00334       0.99666         0.00274       0.00274       0.99726 
2021      1      0.00015      0.00015       0.99650         0.00015       0.00015       0.99711 
2022      2      0.00014      0.00013       0.99637         0.00011       0.00011       0.99700 
2023      3      0.00010      0.00010       0.99627         0.00007       0.00007       0.99693 
2024      4      0.00008      0.00007       0.99619         0.00006       0.00006       0.99687 
2025      5      0.00006      0.00006       0.99613         0.00006       0.00006       0.99681 
2026      6      0.00004      0.00004       0.99610         0.00004       0.00004       0.99677 
2027      7      0.00004      0.00004       0.99606         0.00005       0.00005       0.99672 
2028      8      0.00005      0.00005       0.99601         0.00005       0.00005       0.99667 
2029      9      0.00005      0.00005       0.99596         0.00004       0.00004       0.99663 
2030    10      0.00005      0.00005       0.99590         0.00004       0.00004       0.99659 
2031    11      0.00005      0.00005       0.99585         0.00003       0.00003       0.99656 
2032    12      0.00006      0.00006       0.99580         0.00003       0.00003       0.99653 
2033    13      0.00008      0.00008       0.99572         0.00004       0.00004       0.99649 
2034    14      0.00011      0.00011       0.99561         0.00005       0.00005       0.99644 
2035    15      0.00014      0.00014       0.99548         0.00006       0.00006       0.99638 
2036    16      0.00017      0.00017       0.99530         0.00007       0.00007       0.99631 
2037    17      0.00020      0.00020       0.99510         0.00008       0.00008       0.99623 
2038    18      0.00024      0.00024       0.99486         0.00009       0.00009       0.99615 
2039    19      0.00028      0.00028       0.99458         0.00010       0.00009       0.99605 
2040    20      0.00032      0.00032       0.99426         0.00010       0.00010       0.99595 
2041    21      0.00036      0.00036       0.99390         0.00011       0.00011       0.99584 
2042    22      0.00039      0.00038       0.99352         0.00012       0.00012       0.99572 
2043    23      0.00041      0.00040       0.99311         0.00013       0.00013       0.99559 
2044    24      0.00042      0.00042       0.99270         0.00013       0.00013       0.99546 
2045    25      0.00043      0.00042       0.99227         0.00014       0.00014       0.99532 
2046    26      0.00043      0.00043       0.99185         0.00014       0.00014       0.99518 
2047    27      0.00043      0.00043       0.99142         0.00015       0.00015       0.99503 
2048    28      0.00043      0.00042       0.99099         0.00016       0.00016       0.99486 
2049    29      0.00041      0.00041       0.99058         0.00018       0.00018       0.99469 
2050    30      0.00040      0.00039       0.99019         0.00019       0.00019       0.99450 
2051    31      0.00039      0.00038       0.98981         0.00020       0.00020       0.99430 
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Cohort Life Table for Male and Females born in Ireland in 2020 based on 
CSO Mortality Projection Basis (Contd.)  
                                           Male                                                    Female                
Year   Age     Mortality  Probability  Probability     Mortality    Probability Probability 
                        Rate         of New-        of New            Rate          of New-       of New- 
                                         born in        born in                              born in        born in  
                                      2020 Dying      2020                            2020 Dying      2020 
                                          in Year       Surviving                            in Year       Surviving  
                                                            to End of                                              to End of 
                                                                Year                                                      Year  
2052    32      0.00038      0.00038       0.98943         0.00021       0.00021       0.99409 
2053    33      0.00038      0.00038       0.98905         0.00022       0.00022       0.99388 
2054    34      0.00039      0.00038       0.98867         0.00022       0.00022       0.99366 
2055    35      0.00039      0.00039       0.98828         0.00022       0.00022       0.99344 
2056    36      0.00041      0.00040       0.98788         0.00023       0.00023       0.99321 
2057    37      0.00042      0.00042       0.98746         0.00024       0.00024       0.99298 
2058    38      0.00045      0.00044       0.98702         0.00025       0.00025       0.99273 
2059    39      0.00047      0.00047       0.98655         0.00027       0.00027       0.99246 
2060    40      0.00050      0.00050       0.98605         0.00029       0.00029       0.99217 
2061    41      0.00054      0.00053       0.98552         0.00032       0.00031       0.99186 
2062    42      0.00058      0.00057       0.98495         0.00035       0.00034       0.99151 
2063    43      0.00062      0.00061       0.98435         0.00038       0.00037       0.99114 
2064    44      0.00066      0.00065       0.98370         0.00041       0.00041       0.99073 
2065    45      0.00070      0.00069       0.98301         0.00045       0.00045       0.99028 
2066    46      0.00076      0.00074       0.98226         0.00050       0.00049       0.98979 
2067    47      0.00082      0.00081       0.98146         0.00055       0.00054       0.98925 
2068    48      0.00090      0.00088       0.98058         0.00060       0.00060       0.98865 
2069    49      0.00098      0.00096       0.97961         0.00066       0.00066       0.98799 
2070    50      0.00107      0.00105       0.97856         0.00073       0.00072       0.98727 
2071    51      0.00117      0.00114       0.97742         0.00080       0.00079       0.98648 
2072    52      0.00127      0.00124       0.97617         0.00088       0.00087       0.98561 
2073    53      0.00138      0.00134       0.97483         0.00098       0.00097       0.98464 
2074    54      0.00148      0.00144       0.97339         0.00110       0.00108       0.98356 
2075    55      0.00159      0.00155       0.97184         0.00121       0.00119       0.98237 
2076    56      0.00171      0.00167       0.97018         0.00132       0.00130       0.98107 
2077    57      0.00185      0.00180       0.96838         0.00142       0.00140       0.97967 
2078    58      0.00201      0.00194       0.96644         0.00150       0.00147       0.97820 
2079    59      0.00216      0.00209       0.96434         0.00155       0.00152       0.97668 
2080    60      0.00234      0.00225       0.96209         0.00161       0.00157       0.97511 
2081    61      0.00253      0.00243       0.95966         0.00169       0.00165       0.97346 
2082    62      0.00275      0.00263       0.95702         0.00182       0.00177       0.97169 
2083    63      0.00297      0.00284       0.95418         0.00198       0.00193       0.96976 
2084    64      0.00320      0.00305       0.95113         0.00218       0.00211       0.96765 
2085    65      0.00345      0.00328       0.94785         0.00239       0.00232       0.96533 
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Cohort Life Table for Male and Females born in Ireland in 2020 based on 
CSO Mortality Projection Basis (Contd.)  
                                           Male                                                    Female                
Year   Age     Mortality  Probability  Probability     Mortality    Probability Probability 
                        Rate         of New-        of New            Rate          of New-       of New- 
                                         born in        born in                              born in        born in  
                                      2020 Dying      2020                            2020 Dying      2020 
                                          in Year       Surviving                            in Year       Surviving  
                                                            to End of                                              to End of 
                                                                Year                                                      Year  
2086    66      0.00375      0.00356       0.94429         0.00264       0.00254       0.96279 
2087    67      0.00412      0.00389       0.94041         0.00290       0.00279       0.95999 
2088    68      0.00453      0.00426       0.93614         0.00318       0.00305       0.95694 
2089    69      0.00498      0.00466       0.93148         0.00346       0.00331       0.95364 
2090    70      0.00548      0.00510       0.92638         0.00377       0.00359       0.95004 
2091    71      0.00603      0.00559       0.92079         0.00412       0.00392       0.94613 
2092    72      0.00666      0.00613       0.91466         0.00454       0.00430       0.94183 
2093    73      0.00731      0.00668       0.90797         0.00498       0.00469       0.93714 
2094    74      0.00798      0.00724       0.90073         0.00543       0.00509       0.93205 
2095    75      0.00871      0.00785       0.89288         0.00595       0.00554       0.92651 
2096    76      0.00956      0.00854       0.88435         0.00657       0.00608       0.92042 
2097    77      0.01056      0.00934       0.87501         0.00734       0.00676       0.91366 
2098    78      0.01161      0.01016       0.86486         0.00820       0.00749       0.90617 
2099    79      0.01267      0.01096       0.85390         0.00911       0.00825       0.89792 
2100    80      0.01388      0.01185       0.84204         0.01014       0.00911       0.88881 
2101    81      0.01536      0.01293       0.82911         0.01138       0.01012       0.87870 
2102    82      0.01720      0.01426       0.81485         0.01290       0.01134       0.86736 
2103    83      0.02018      0.01644       0.79841         0.01497       0.01298       0.85437 
2104    84      0.02242      0.01790       0.78051         0.01683       0.01438       0.84000 
2105    85      0.02484      0.01939       0.76112         0.01888       0.01586       0.82413 
2106    86      0.02746      0.02090       0.74022         0.02114       0.01742       0.80671 
2107    87      0.03026      0.02240       0.71782         0.02360       0.01904       0.78768 
2108    88      0.03323      0.02385       0.69397         0.02628       0.02070       0.76698 
2109    89      0.03637      0.02524       0.66873         0.02917       0.02237       0.74460 
2110    90      0.03965      0.02651       0.64221         0.03227       0.02403       0.72057 
2111    91      0.04305      0.02765       0.61457         0.03556       0.02563       0.69495 
2112    92      0.05560      0.03417       0.58040         0.04631       0.03218       0.66277 
2113    93      0.07169      0.04161       0.53879         0.06023       0.03992       0.62285 
2114    94      0.09229      0.04972       0.48907         0.07820       0.04871       0.57414 
2115    95      0.11858      0.05799       0.43107         0.10136       0.05819       0.51594 
2116    96      0.15207      0.06555       0.36552         0.13110       0.06764       0.44831 
2117    97      0.19463      0.07114       0.29438         0.16918       0.07584       0.37246 
2118    98      0.24859      0.07318       0.22120         0.21779       0.08112       0.29135 
2119    99      0.31689      0.07010       0.15110         0.27968       0.08148       0.20986 
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Cohort Life Table for Male and Females born in Ireland in 2020 based on 
CSO Mortality Projection Basis (Contd.)  
                                           Male                                                    Female                
Year   Age     Mortality  Probability  Probability     Mortality    Probability Probability 
                        Rate         of New-        of New            Rate          of New-       of New- 
                                         born in        born in                              born in        born in  
                                      2020 Dying      2020                            2020 Dying      2020 
                                          in Year       Surviving                            in Year       Surviving  
                                                            to End of                                              to End of 
                                                                Year                                                      Year  
2120  100      0.40321      0.06093       0.09018         0.35827       0.07519       0.13467 
2121  101      0.42361      0.03820       0.05198         0.38119       0.05134       0.08334 
2122  102      0.44303      0.02303       0.02895         0.40342       0.03362       0.04972 
2123  103      0.46137      0.01336       0.01559         0.42475       0.02112       0.02860 
2124  104      0.47854      0.00746       0.00813         0.44501       0.01273       0.01587 
2125  105      0.49448      0.00402       0.00411         0.46406       0.00737       0.00851 
2126  106      0.50918      0.00209       0.00202         0.48182       0.00410       0.00441 
2127  107      0.52264      0.00105       0.00096         0.49823       0.00220       0.00221 
2128  108      0.53490      0.00052       0.00045         0.51327       0.00114       0.00108 
2129  109      0.54600      0.00024       0.00020         0.52697       0.00057       0.00051 
2130  110      0.55601      0.00011       0.00009         0.53936       0.00027       0.00023 
2131  111      0.56498      0.00005       0.00004         0.55050       0.00013       0.00011 
2132  112      0.57300      0.00002       0.00002         0.56048       0.00006       0.00005 
2133  113      0.58015      0.00001       0.00001         0.56936       0.00003       0.00002 
2134  114      0.58649      0.00000       0.00000         0.57724       0.00001       0.00001 
2135  115      0.59211      0.00000       0.00000         0.58421       0.00000       0.00000  
Source: CSO, 2018; Naqvi and Whelan, 2019.  
Note: Please note that probability of new-born in 2020 dying in any future calendar year or 
surviving to the end of the same year do not sum to 1 after year 2020 as there is a probability 
that the new-born in 2020 will not survive to the calendar year in question. 
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